Abstract-This paper presents a novel key issuing scheme for distributed online social networks based on identity-based encryption (IBE). The scheme involves two essential objects, Key Privacy Authority (KPA) and Privacy Chum (PC). KPA and PC cannot impersonate network users to obtain users' private keys. The experiment results indicate that the scheme is feasible and efficient, and it can sustain large-scale online social networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional online social networks (OSNs) are centralized networks. Their service is mainly centralized management, which is not able to provide users with sharing information service among multiple OSNs [1] . If a user is interested in multiple OSNs, he will have to register one after another. It wastes a lot of time of the users, because they are not able to transfer friends' data from one online network to another. Also it leads to serious consequences because the user's personal information is dispersed in multiple OSNs, which is inconvenient for them to manage and protect personal information. Thus, it results in privacy information leakage. Therefore, distributed OSNs privacy protection becomes a hot issue.
Traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) based on the certificate is well known. It utilizes digital certificates to verify the authenticity of the user's identity, and issues keys to users. The digital certificates need a central authority to manage access control and keys uniformly. The authority is usually presumed to be reliable, which issues, updates, and revokes keys. However, the authority sometimes is malicious. Then it will bring tremendous challenge to certificate management. In 1984 Shamir put forward an idea [2] , until 2001 researchers of Stanford University and University of California, Davis concretely realized the IBE privacy protection scheme on its basis [3] . IBE encryption scheme, to a certain degree, improves the traditional public key encryption mechanism: it does not demand digital certificates and provides more facile authentication technique of user ID. But it demands a centralized server and a secure channel, which are difficult to guarantee in real-world networks.
In recent years, research on distributed OSNs has emerged. Key management scheme in distributed OSNs is studied by G. Felix [15] . This research outlines strict requirements and weak constraints for data encryption in distributed OSNs. However, it still requires a detailed security analysis from cryptographic view. Afterwards, a completely distributed approach for group management based on hash tables is designed by H. Olivier [16] . Registering to this system by using the approach is not controlled by any central authority. Any user can create groups, and current applications can share the existing groups' information. While this approach neglects key renewal protocol and adaptation mechanisms to balance load for extremely popular groups.
So far, most literatures cannot resolve the following problems, (1) Most of current key issuing schemes are offline, based on traditional PKI schemes or attribute-based encryption (ABE). They all require secure channels. If network users execute the key issuing schemes online, they would sustain replay attacks and insider attacks. In addition, secure channels are difficult to obtain and applied in real-world networks. (2) In current studies, most schemes require a central authority. The central authorities always are served by network service providers. Then it is easy to get the private keys of users for mediators (eg. the social network service providers) in current researches. This can cause middle-man attacks. To address the above problems, this paper presents a novel key issuing scheme based on KPA and PC for IBE-based distributed online social networks. This scheme no longer demands secure channels, and either KPA or PC cannot impersonate the users to get their keys.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, IBE encryption mechanism is developed to resolve privacy protection issues in OSNs. With user demands and attack methods constantly changing, traditional IBE cannot satisfy the requirements of OSNs. Therefore, IBE-based DOSN has gradually been introduced by researchers to resolve security privacy issues, which merges multiple OSNs in the true sense [4] . After traditional IBE privacy protection scheme was devised, many key issuing schemes were proposed. Sliva presented the most important ID-based key management schemes, discussing their advantages and disadvantages, and comparing their main features [5] . Smart proposed an ID-based identity authentication protocol, and discussed the attributes of the protocol [6] .
Recently, DOSN received attention. Buchegger and Schioberg presented a distributed P2P (peer-to-peer) approach coupled with encryption. In order to test its flexibility, the authors devised related protocol to realize distributed OSN [7] . Three schemes were proposed for decentralized OSNs, in which each user stores his own personal information in a local machine [4] . Afterwards, a novel P2P approach in OSNs was presented, avoiding centralized control of malicious Internet service provider (ISP) [8] .
Shamir secret sharing scheme proposed the concept of secret piece for the first time [9] . Soon after, privacy protection on distributed networks becomes a prevalent. Paterson presented partial key issuing scheme based on multiple key generation centers (KGCs), and each user merged partial keys into an integrated key [10] . A router-level-based approach was introduced by B. Parno, which can control denial-of-capability (DoC) to attack the specified area [11] . Li presented a trust-based model, PeerTrust for distributed P2P networks [12] . The model involves a adaptive trust model for quantifying and comparing the trustworthiness of users based on a transaction-based feedback system, and a distributed implementation of such a model over a structured P2P network. In 2009, a new ID-based issuing protocol was researched by Ryu [13] . This approach permits the obtaining of node IDs to be tightly regulated without the complexities and costs associated with traditional certificate schemes. The analysis shows that the cost of the ID-based protocol is nominal. Due to the low cost of IBE encryption scheme, related ID service can extend to P2P networks which possesses millions of users.
In the last two years, more novel privacy protection schemes in social networks are presented. An approach based on GSNPP algorithm is proposed [17] . By clustering the nodes in social networks and making generalization not only within cluster but also among clusters, to attain the purpose of privacy protection. And then quantifies the information loss of different types in anonymity process. Then, a method based on Gaussian randomization multiplication is presented. The method applies an undirected weighted graph to represent a social network [18] . By using the Gaussian randomization multiplication method, the approach can disturb the weights of some edges to maintain the shortest path of the social network and to make its length as close as possible to that in the original network in order to realize the privacy preservation in social networks. To prevent information loss more, H. Lu, P. Magdalena and others proposed SocialCDN [19] . By caching the social updates, SocialCDN can be able to propagate efficient data among social network users through fewer network connections.
Meanwhile, more studies about privacy security in distributed social networks emerge. LotusNet, a framework for development of distributed social networks relying on P2P paradigm is proposed [20] . It can support strong user authentication and tackle the trade-off problem between security, privacy and services in distributed social networks by providing the users the possibility to adjust their privacy settings through a very flexible and fine-grained access control system. Distributed social networks without trusted identities are particularly vulnerable to Sybil attacks. To solve the problem, W. Wei, X. Fengyuan and others presented SybilDefender, a scheme that counterpoise network topologies to defend against Sybil attacks in large social networks [21] . Based on performing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks.
The architecture addresses the problem of identifying the top-k information hubs in social networks [22] . The method can identify information hubs without requiring a central authority to access the complete topology graph. The authors achieve this purpose by distributing the computation using the Kempe-McSherry algorithm, while considering users' privacy concerns. To arrive at an anonymous view of the uniformed network without revealing to any of the data holders information about links between nodes that are controlled by other data holders. Tamir and Cohen research the distributed settings in which the network data is separated between multiple data holders [23] . For the purpose, they begin with the centralized setting and offer two variants of an anonymous algorithm which is based on sequential clustering (SQ). The algorithms significantly are superior to the SaNGreeA algorithm due to Campan and Truta which is the primary algorithm for obtaining anonymity in networks by means of clustering. They as well as design several secure distributed versions of the algorithms. To realize encryption and fine-grained access control at the same time. A fine-grained access control scheme based on attribute-based encryption (ABE) was proposed [24] . The scheme achieves the description for different granularity of users in social network through the setting of the attribute, which is the basis for the finegrained encryption and access control. In particular, they employ a proxy server to analyze the relationship between the unauthorized users and authorized users. If the unauthorized users were analyzed to have the access to the attributes, the KGC would generate private keys for them based on ABE. The scheme achieved the transitivity of the access rights. But the ABE encryption scheme requires a secure channel, which is difficult gained in social networks.
The above research works protected users' secret information to a certain degree, but they still had some drawbacks: most schemes require secure channels and they mostly execute offline, and KGC in some research work may simulate users in networks to obtain users' private keys. For this reason, this paper proposes a novel secure key issuing scheme based on KPA and PC. KPA is selected from organizations engaged in privacy protection, and PCs are selected from ISPs in OSN. If PC is vicious, inside attack can be triggered. Thus, this paper develops Byzantine [14] to verify PC's reliability. The experiment results show that the scheme in this paper is feasible, and can support large-scale OSN, having strong adaptability.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME This paper present a novel secure key issuing scheme based on KPA and PC for IBE-based OSNs. The scheme has strong feasibility and adaptability. In this section, we introduce pivotal entities and detailed implementing procedures.
The pivotal entities are: (1) KPA can be regarded as a kernel server, and its function is equal to KGC in IBE encryption scheme. In our scheme, we assume KPA is highly fault tolerant and always available; (2) PCs are selected from ISPs in OSNs. PCs are not required to be as reliable as KPA, therefore, malicious attackers may compromise some ISPs to perform inside attack; (3) User is a common person who logins OSNs, which is vulnerable to all kinds of attacks.
This scheme has two primary techniques: (1) The scheme must provide a secure key issuing approach without secure channels, and resist man-in-the-middle attacks and insider attacks. (2) Because the PCs' reliability is random, our scheme requires designing a method to distinguish malicious PCs and removing them away.
A. Implementation Procedures 1) User Registration
Users must register via KPA before joining in the OSN. User A first sends registration request to KPA. After KPA receives the request, KPA returns A corresponding registration information. However, in real-world networks, the communication between KPA and A may be intercepted or falsified. We develop Shamir secret sharing scheme to protect their communication. The protocol is as follows: We divide user A registration information to num pieces. Even if registration information is intercepted or falsified, the protocol can guarantee to recover it completely, so long as user A receives more than k different pieces. The registration procedures are as follows:
Stage 1: User A sends registration request to KPA. The registration request includes a random number.
Stage 2: After KPA receives the registration request, the KPA generates corresponding registration information, dividing it into num pieces. Then KPA issues these pieces to different PCs.
Stage 3: PC returns user A the piece and the random number that he receives. After A receives at least k pieces from different PCs, the registration procedures stop. If A does not have sufficient pieces, the registration procedures run again.
In stage 1, the user A finds KPA by PC or automatic service mechanism in networks. Then A sends registration request to it.
In Stage 6: When user A receives at least k different PK pieces, he will obtain his PK-A. If the number of PK pieces is fewer than k , user A returns to stage 2. In the above process, if the user's privacy suffers attack, user A can send a request to PCs again. As long as user A receives at least k different PK pieces in predefined time, he can recover his whole PK. The key issuing scheme can resist man-in-the-middle attacks and insider attacks.
B. Primary Techniques 1) PC Group Selection
PCs in our scheme are selected from ISPs in OSNs. Even though PCs are not required to be as reliable as KPA, we try our best to avoid selecting malicious ISP. This paper adopts Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) to address PCs selection. When KPA authenticates PC's reliability, it will send an authenticated query to PC. If a PC is malicious, it will hide the malicious action. Therefore, KPA must adopt anonymous query.
The authenticate approach is: KPA first selects partial users as forward group (FG). The number of FG is Number , and they assist the KPA to achieve PCs selection. The procedures are as follows:
Stage 1: KPA verifies whether member in FG has at least k PK pieces. Stage 2: After KPA picks a registered user, it sends the user's account information and ( , )
ii ID PK to a member in FG. Then, KPA successively sends Number users' privacy information to all members of FG.
Stage 3: After member in FG receives ( , )
ii ID PK , the member By the above process, the number of PCs comes down to an appreciable value.
2) Threshold
num Setting In the phase of registration, we present num as significant for privacy protection. This section gives the range of num . We suppose the number of PCs is N , and the length of average lookup path in network is L (the path is between user and PC). We let p denote the probability of a user becoming malicious attacker at the time.
In order to guarantee the scheme in this paper to resist collusion attack, we must ensure that num is greater than the number of compromised paths. As the probability of a user becoming malicious attacker is p , the probability of bad paths is: 1 (1 ) L p

. Then, we find that the number of bad paths is:
. Then, we have ( num num badpath  ). To resist denial of service (DOS) attack, we must guarantee that the user receives sufficient information pieces. For this reason, num must be less than the number of secure paths. So we have ( num N num badpath  ). We assume one network possessing 100000 users. We add some malicious users to the network. Considering the worst case, we assume each malicious user can attack all the paths between the normal user and the PC. We manually add the number of malicious users in steps of 0.1%. According to the above approach, the probability of a path being bad is
The result shows that the above approach is feasible.
C. Instance based on the Proposed Scheme
To apply the scheme proposed into practice, we give a simple example in network. Firstly, we assume a network topology structure. Figure 1 . represents a simple network topology structure. In the topology structure, we assume that 1 2, 7 , ,..., U U U have registered into the network and they all be selected PCs. The KPA in the graph is the key generate and issue center. It is special authority engaged in privacy protection that the network selects.
1) User A Joining in the Network
Firstly, we compute that 7 num  , 4 k  according to the above expressions. The two parameters is important in latter section.
Before User A joining in the network, he must register by the KPA. User A sends a registration request to the KPA at the first. The registration request involves a random number. After the KPA receives the registration request, the KPA returns user A corresponding registration information. In realistic network, user finds the KPA by automatic search service mechanism.
The registration procedures are as follows: After User A finds the KPA, he sends a registration request to KPA and generates a random number; The KPA generates corresponding registration information and divides it into 7 pieces once the KPA receives the registration request, Then KPA hands out these pieces to the seven PCs. Meanwhile, each piece includes the random number; Then, PCs returns user A the piece and the random number that he receives. After A receives a piece from PC, he must check the random number. PK PK PK PK . Arbitrary 4 from different PCs can help the user acquire his PK (refer to 3.1.2). In order to obtain his own PK, user A sends request to the KPA. After KPA receives the request, it checks registration information and the related random number, verifying if user A is registered or not. If it is the same as the original registration information, KPA generates PK A and divides it into 7 pieces. Then KPA sends these pieces to different PCs respectively. If not, the registration procedures run again.
Afterwards, User A sends a request to each PC for getting his own PK. After each PC receives the request, it checks the registration information and the related random number. If A has registered, PC issues the piece to user A. If not, the registration procedures run again. Once user A receives at least 4 different pieces, he can obtain his PK A . If the number of pieces is fewer than 4, user A returns to stage 2. In the procedure, if the user's PK request suffers malicious attack, user A can send PK request to PCs once again until he receives an least 4 pieces . From the instance, we can see that the scheme proposed is feasible in the network. Then, it can be applied more large-scale real-world networks. In the section IV, we make use of experiment and simulation to verify its practicability.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of KPA and PC in key issuing procedures. The data in Table I give the implementation time of each operation in IBE encryption scheme (Computer configuration: Intel Core i3-2350M 2.30GHZ). To evaluate the number of users that the scheme can support, we denote five variables as follows: f is the frequency of one user request for his PK; R is the probability of CPU being occupied; P is the probability of member in PC group being selected; Number-KPA is the maximum number of users one KPA serves in a given time period; Number-PC is maximum number of users one PC serves in a predefined time period.
From the above definitions, we obtain that the time of the CPU being occupied is tR  in a time period t , and the implementation time of From Table II , we come to know that the number of users KPA and PC can serve decreases with the frequency increasing of requests for PKs of networks users. If the user requests for his PK every 1 hour, the number of users KPA and PC can serve in 1 second is up to 5 
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. FIG. 2 represents that the value of Number-KPA (the number of users KPA can serve) changes with 1/ f . We can see that the variation extent of the number of users KPA can serve is very large with the change of f . The value of Number-KPA is too large to display fully in this graph. Yet the variation tendency is clear and intuitionistic. The KPA can support large-scale distributed social networks. . From the graph, we can see that the relationship of Number-PC and R is more intimate. While in real-world social networks, the frequency of request for his PK of one user (the value of f ) is very low. Therefore, the PC can also be applied in large-scale networks.
Based on the above analysis, the scheme that this paper proposes can support large-scale social networks. And it does not require certificates, a central authority, and secure channels. At the same time, in realistic applications, the execution time of the IBE encryption scheme is quite short, each user in social network can communication with more members of PC group simultaneously. The experimental results show that the scheme in this paper is efficient and feasible.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a secure key issuing scheme based on KPA and PC for IBE-based DOSNs. The scheme adopts KPA and PC cooperation to issue keys to users. Although this approach is still being researched, this paper draws the conclusion that the core idea of our scheme is feasible and efficient. In later research work, we hope it could be extended to real DOSNs. This will be a significant issue. Experimental results show that: the scheme based on KPA and PC is highly effective, and can support large-scale OSN.
